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1 Introduction
Are the revenues from resource extraction income or disinvestment in natural capital? A
natural answer to this question would be to calculate the value of the remaining reserves,
the resource wealth, and define changes in this wealth as the part of the revenues that can
be considered disinvestment in natural capital, and counting the returns to the wealth as
income. With no uncertainty, a sustainable policy would require that only the return from
the wealth is consumed, at least in the long run. With a reasonable stable wealth, a similar
rule would apply even with uncertainty, as argued below. The nation would then have to
save during good years when revenues are higher than the permanent income, and borrow
in bad years.
An application of this approach to the Norwegian petroleum wealth in Aslaksen et al.
(1990), revealed that the petroleum wealth was highly unstable, due to changes in the
official price projections. The unexpected changes in wealth was estimated to be at the size
of Norway's GDP at the highest. This finding undermines the normative relevance of the
definition of income component of the petroleum revenues. Since the wealth was fluctuating
with the oil prices, the wealth and hence the permanent income was high when the revenues
were high. In this sense there were no 'good' or 'bad' years, and hence the policy indicated
above would not stabilize the spendings. In other words, the 'permanent' income would not
be permanent.
The estimates in Aslaksen et al. (1990) was based on official price projections, projections
that were not intended for this use. Still these projection was the best avaialble information
on the befliefs about future prices at each pint in time, hence to use these projections
was a natural choice when considering the rationality of the policy given the beliefs. The
importance of the changes in wealth reporten in Alskasen et al. (1990) is sufficient to justify
an empirical analysis of the underlying oil price process. On the other hand, the official
price projections are based on model analysis, and some of these model are based on a much
more comprehensive econometric analysis than the one provided here. Still, these studies
were undertaken to quantify parameters in a model, and not to investigate the time series
properties of oil wealth.
Since the projections were not intended for wealth estimates, elements of the projections
that are essential to wealth estimates, like the growth rate, may not have been carefully
considered. If the projections were intended for the short or intermediate run, the difference
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between 0 and 2 % growth rate is negligible. For estimation of wealth, the growth rate is
highly important. Moreover, different persons may have been responsible for the different
projections, in which case much of the volatility of wealth estimates may be accidental. Thus
an empirical investigation of the time series properties of the oil price process is required
to evaluate the volatility of oil wealth. Such an investigation is the purpose of the present
paper.
There is of course much both theoretical and empirical work on the oil prices. The
simplest models prescribe prices to grow at a rate equal to the rate of interest, the Hotelling
rule. While Hotellings (1931) seminal paper was the origin of this rule, he recognized that
the simple rule was too simple to apply to real markets. For a recent discussion see Farzin
(1992), and for an empirical evaluation see Miller and Upton (1985). Much work on optimal
resource extraction has assumed that the prices follow a geometrical brownian motion, a
stochastic variant of the Hotelling rule, but as demonstrated in Lund (1992) this process
can hardly be the equilibrium price process in a resource market. Still the prevailing view in
the market, as reported in Manne and Schrattenholtzer (1988), corresponds closely to the
expectation paths that would prevail with prices following a geometrical brownian motion.
The typical picture is that mean prices from different projections will start at the current
price and grow at a constant rate. Many of these projections are based on much more data
than used in the current empirical analysis. Studies analogous to the one reported here are
found in Bernhardsen (1989) and espesially in Green et al (1993), who has also provided us
with the datas used for this study. The present study differs from all of these studies in the
focus on the parameter uncertainty and the effect of new information on the volatility of oil
wealth.
2 Uncertainty and the normative properties of wealth
A number of papers in Norway during the 1980s have focused on the vulnerability of an
economy highly dependent on oil revenues. Much emphasis has been put on the correct
measurement of national saving. The Norwegian National Accounts show an immense in-
crease in national savings in the first half of the 1980s, as a result of the fast increase in
petroleum extraction and the oil price shock at the start of the decade. The question then
arose as to what the relevant measure of savings is, if changes in the wealth of petroleum
are taken properly into account.
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Skånland (1985) saw petroleum extraction as depletion of wealth only, and obtains "cor-
rected" savings ratios simply by subtracting the annual resource rent from national income. 1
Strom (1986) instead calculates savings ratios where changes in the wealth of petroleum re-
serves are accounted for. He defines petroleum wealth as current net price times reserves.
This coincides with the expected net present value, if expected future net price of oil and
gas increases at a rate equal to the discount rate (the Hotelling rule). 2
In the aftermath of the 1986 turn-round, a government-appointed committee was es-
tablished to review the economic prospects of Norway. The report delivered, NOU (1988),
recommended that the wealth balances of oil revenue spending should be taken into ac-
count, suggesting that spending adjusted for wealth accounting had been too high. The
committee chairman argued for a spending schedule based on permanent income, defined as
the real return on the oil wealth. This preserves the oil wealth and gives each generation an
equal share of the wealth. "Total savings were strongly overestimated (1980-86). Whether
or not the politicians would have followed a less expansive economic policy, provided they
had more correct information on national income and saving in these years, is a question
we shall probably never know the answer to." (Steigum (1989).) According to Cappelen
and Gjelsvik (1990), the reference here is probably to the computations in NOU (1988), in
which the "petroleum-adjusted" savings ratio is 2-9 % lower than the ordinary savings ratio
for the year 1981-85.
However, in Aslaksen et al. (1990) the authors claim that the conclusion is quite opposite. 3
For the period 1973 to 1989, the value of extracted petroleum have been lower than expected
returns on the Norwegian petroleum wealth. The reason for the divergence, is that NOU
(1988) compute the wealth as if prices and reserves were known in advance. For example,
the wealth of petroleum in 1980 is calculated by assuming actual development of prices from
1980 till 1988, and then expected prices from 1988 and beyond. Thus, according to Aslaksen
et al. (1990), these results cannot be used as a background for evaluation of the management
of the wealth of petroleum, since they are based on information that was not available when
the policy decisions were made: Recommendations based on these calculations will therefore
'However, as Strom (1986) emphasizes, this is depletion of a non-existing wealth, if the wealth of
petroleum is not included in the National Accounts. Skinland's savings ratio therefore turns out very
low
2Large fluctuations, especially in the price of petroleum, then also cause extreme fluctuations in the
savings ratio (from 18 to 60 % in the period 1980-84).
3See also Brekke et al. (1989).
have a strong character of hindsight.
To avoid this hindsight, estimates of the wealth at time t has to be based on the in-
formation available at time t. As a consequence the wealth may be very unstable due to
changes in the price prospect on oil. If the size of this unsability is as reported in Aslaksen
et al., the relevancy of wealth estimates as a basis for measuring the national saving may
be questioned..
The definition of petroleum wealth, used in the calculations in e.g. Aslaksen et al. (1990),
is
Wt =	 Et [Psx, — c,](1 r)'' ,
s=t
where Wt denotes the wealth, and PH denotes expectations given the information available
at time t. Ps is the oil price in period s. (xtt ,x4 i , ...) and (4, . is the path of
extraction and cost, respectively. These are the expected paths given the information at
time t. Since new fields are discovered, and since the extraction path is reoptimized every
period, es , and x , will vary with t. We have used the same cost and extraction series as in
Aslaksen et al. (1990). See Boring (1994) for a discussion of these assumptions. T is the
horizon, chosen long enough to include the date of depletion. Finally, r is the discount rate.
Introducing •t = Ptxt — q, actual changes in wealth, DWt = Wt+1 —
posed as
Awt
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- t
= >: 	 _ Et[rs ] ) ( i+ r)t+i-s
s=t-Fi
r E Et [r3](1+ r) t s
s=t-Fi
(2)	
— rt.
The change in wealth is here decomposed into three terms. The first one expresses changes
in expectations, we
 The second term is the expected return from the wealth remaining
after x t is extracted, Wtrw . Finally the last term is the revenues from extraction at time
t, AWf. Expected return may be higher than the current value of extraction. This will
typically be the case if rt is small compared to Et[rsi for sufficiently many s > t.
(1)
wt, can be decom-
Aslaksen et al. (1990) found that the wealth of petroleum has fluctuated between 413 and
2273 bill Nkr, 1986 prices, during the 1980's. The reason for these large changes in wealth,
is mainly price fluctuations. From 1981 to 1987, a steady reduction in price expectations
caused a reduction in the wealth of petroleum of 2278 bill Nkr. This is about four times
the size of the yearly Norwegian GDP for the same period. Unexpected changes in wealth
of this size causes obvious problems for the management of petroleum wealth.
According to the Hicksian definition of income, the income part of the revenue is the
amount the nation could consume without impoverishing itself. With no uncertainty, con-
stant interest rate and constant prices, this would imply a constant wealth. We note that if
the first term above (related to changes in expectations) is zero, the wealth could be kept
constant if re = 1 14 , Wt , which is then the permanent income from the wealth. For the Nor-
wegian petroleum wealth this was calculated to be two to three times the actual revenues
at least until OPEC III in 1986. Spending this amount annually would have been a very
bad policy for Norway, due to the huge unexpected changes (reductions) in wealth. But all
this is, according to the calculations in Aslaksen et al. (1990), based on governmental price
projections. With alternative assumptions about the future oil prices the picture could be
different.
Consider the case when the oil prices are behaving like purely white noise, i.e. rs is
independent of rt
 for t s. Then Et ['Ts] = Et' [7r8 } for all t, t' < s. Thus the only possible
unexpected change in the wealth from one year to the next, is the value of the next years
revenues. Expected future revenues are unchanged. The other extreme case is the random
walk, where Pt -,-- Pt_ i u t , with E [u t] = O. In this case Et [1334= PtE[x s], if x and P are
independent. Thus a shift in the price from one year to the next would change the expected
value of all future revenues. Thus the time series properties of the oil price is important to
the size of the unexpected changes in wealth. We now turn to the study of these properties.
3 Unit roots and volatility
Consider a stochastic process Xt of the form4
Xt = AXE _1 + Ut
The roots of this process is the eigenvalues of the matrix A. The process has a unit root if
one of the eigenvalues A of A is unitary, i.e. IA1 = 1. If the eigenvalues are distinct, A can be
written as A = Ui AU where U is a unitary matrix, and A = diag(Ai, , )O. In this case
E [X,IXt] =	 t U Xt,
where A3-4 = diag(Ar t ,	 , Asjt). If lA i E < 1 for all i, the effect of a shift in Xt will be
dampened over time, A approaches the zero matrix in the long run. If one of the eigenvalues
is unitary, a shift in Xt will have a permanent effect on the future expectations.
A simple model that would contain both the extreme cases mentioned in the introduction
is an AR(1) process. In the simplest form we may assume that
Pt = aPt-i ut.
In this case the root of the process is a. The process has a unit root if lai = 1, but in this
particular case only a = 1 is relevant. In the case a = 1 the process will be the random
walk considered above, while the process is white noise if a = O. The governmental price
projections typically state a constant growth rate, an assumption that would correspond
to a random walk on logarithmic form. For this reason we have chosen to work with the
logarithmic form. We slightly extend the class of processing by adding a constant.
Let pt denote the log of the price process, Pt
 = ln(Pt). We assume that the log of the
price process is a linear AR(1) process of the form
(3 )	 Pt = ao aiPt-i 14,
where u t IIN(0,o-2). Recursive use of (3) yield
4Note that a process with longer lags may also be written on this form. E.g. the AR(2) process
Pt = aiPt-i + a2Pt-2 + ut will be of this form with XI = [Pt , Pt- i] and
Xt
 1 0 
Xt-i + [=
0
al a2 Ut
s-t-1
(4) ps = aoA,,t
 artpt E
i=o
where A5
, = El=4-1 air Thus P, is lognormal distributed given the observation Pt for s > t,
and
(5) 1	
8-4
E[P,IPt] = exp (a0A.,,t 4- -0-2A2't, pai2	 '
where=s,t - L4=o -1 •
The oil wealth at time t, defined as the expected present value of future revenues, is:
(6) Wt = E(E[P5 11)4x, c5)(1+ r)t_s = Xt Ct,
s=t
where Xt
 = ET_t E[P,IPtjx,(1 r)t_s is the present value of the production, and Ct =
ET,t c5(1 r)ts is the present value of the cost. Let Ps
 = E[Ps iPt] denote the expected
price, given the current price and the parameters ao , al and a. ict denote the corresponding
value of Xt . We want to consider how sensitive the wealth is to changes in the price Pt and
the parameters. Suppose that the price at time t is given a proportional shift, to the new
price ePt . We note that Ct is as before, while by (5)
Xt = Epseartx.o.
s=t
The effect of this shift is determined by the parameter al . If al = 1, then Vr t = for all
s. Thus Xt
 = at. Since the cost is unchanged, the effect on the petroleum wealth is more
than proportional to the shift in the oil price. Thus with a i = 1, the uncertainty of the
petroleum wealth is even higher than the uncertainty of the oil prices. On the other hand, if
al < 1, then ar t O as s --+ oo, and (11--t -> 1. The rate of convergence depends upon the
size of al . The effect of a change in prices on the wealth depends on the extraction path,
the relative size of X and C, and finally on the parameter a l . To give some flavor to (7), we
compute the changes in wealth corresponding to an shift in the oil price when X = 1.5C,
r = 0.07, and the baseline value of extraction path is constant (Psx, is independent of s)
and infinite. Let the elasticity of wealth, with respect to oil prices, denote the percentage
change in wealth when current price increases 1 %, = 0.01. This elasticity is given in the
following table, for different values of al :
(7)
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al 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.95
elasticity 0.24 0.37 0.57 1.23 1.75
Due to the cost-term, the elasticity is higher than one, even when the process has no unit
root. As a benchmark, note that if the cost is constant over time, then Ptxt = 1.5 • ct , given
the assumptions above. Thus the oil revenues would increase by 3 % if the oil price shift 1
%, but the wealth is less volatile than the oil revenues (Pxt ct ), except for al = 1. As
pointed out in the introduction, the volatility of oil wealth is important to the management
of the wealth.
In the case al = 1, any shift in the price Pt will have a permanent effect on future prices,
in the sense that expected prices at all future points in time will shift proportionally. For
al < 1, the shift in expected future prices are less than proportional. However, this requires
that the parameters are stable.
The oil market has been very difficult to model. Partly due to the unstable political
state in the Middle East, the oil market has experienced several shocks since 1973. If these
shocks are interpreted as permanent changes in the market structure, the parameters of the
price process should change. Let us first consider the shift in expected prices when ao is
shifted. Note that A.,t start at the value 1 for s = t + 1 increasing to 1/(1 — al ) as s co.
Thus the shift in expected prices will be increasing in s. On the other hand there is always
a cause for a shift in parameters.
Suppose that a shift 4. in the price, at time t, is explained as a shift in the long run
equilibrium path. Then
Aao 1n(e)
	 JAPt
 ----- i — al
Note that (5) can be rewritten as
(8)	 E[P,IPt] = exP (aoils,t 1
	
2	 artpt) .
Moreover, since
art 	1
A,,t 	
	1 — a l 	1 — a l
we see that E[Ps iPt] 415,. Thus even if al is small, the effect of a price shift is permanent
if it is interpreted as a shift in parameters. Thus if OPEC I in 1973 is interpreted as a
shift in market structure, and represented as a dummy in the estimation, the whole path
of expected future prices will shift, and the oil wealth will be very sensitive to such chocks.
This is quite intuitive. Less obvious is the effect on the volatility of oil wealth in the period
after the shock.
Consider OPEC I in 1973 interpreted as a permanent shock. Using yearly prices, the
first observation that give any information on the shift of Aao would be the price in 1974.
This is obviously a meager information to estimate the size of the shift. Thus every new
observation would contribute significantly to the knowledge about this shift. Thus even if
al
 is very low, and even if we assume no shift between 1974 and 1975, the price changes
from 1974 to 1975 will have permanent effect on expected future prices, since Aao
 is very
sensitive to the 1975 observation.
We conclude that it is not sufficient to test for unit roots to evaluate the volatility of oil
wealth, even in the years between the structural shifts. To estimate volatility, the wealth
should be computed each year, given the information available at that year. An empirical
study along these lines is presented below.
4 Empirical result
Aslaksen et al. (1990) have recovered the "projections" about the oil price from governmen-
tal White Papers, especially national budgets and long-term programs. These projections
typically start at the current price level, and grow steadily at an annual rate between 0 and
%. Interpreting these projections as expectations, they corresponds to the expectations
given in the model above, with a l = 1, and ao varying from 0 to 2 %. The effect of a price
shift on the wealth is somewhat ambiguous. Since a l = 1, a price shift will have a perma-
nent effect on the future expected prices. On the other hand, a simultaneous shift in ao may
either dampen or reinforce this effect. Both effects are present in the official projections.
When prices increased in 1980, there was a modest optimism, reflected in a () = 1 %. Even
though the prices fell from 1980 to 1981, the optimism appears to have grown, since in 1981
the growth rate in prices was 2 %. This shift dominates the effect of the price fall, and
unexpected changes in wealth is actually positive. But the prices continued to fall during
the 1980's, and the optimism decreased, reflected in a declining growth rate, eventually in
1985, reaching a () =
 O %. These shifts reinforced the effects of falling prices, and the wealth
fell fast in spite of rather stable prices.
As pointed out in the introduction, we should be careful in interpreting time series prop-
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erties of the governmental view on the oil price process from such projections. An optimistic
projection may be used strategically to support an expansive policy, or the optimists within
the Ministry of Finance may be strengthened from the increasing prices. The projection
may thus reflect nobody's view on the price process. Finally, the governmental beliefs may
be inconsistent with data. Thus it is interesting to study the empirical properties of the
price process.
As a point of departure, we estimate the parameters in (3) on yearly data on the oil
price from 1908, using a time series on oil prices constructed by Green et al. (1993). The
parameters are reestimated for each year after 1973. The petroleum wealth is then computed
for each year, given the parameters that are estimated given the oil prices until and including
this year. Thus the wealth estimate for year t is based on the available information at time t,
but not on information that was not yet available. The estimate of al is about 0.74 which is
high, but significantly less than 1. Since this estimation is based on about 100 observations,
an additional observation will only have a minor effect on the parameters, and hence the
parameters are rather stable over the period from 1973 to 1989.
The petroleum wealth, with the estimates of c/o , al and q, is given in table 1. These
wealth estimates are in general much lower that the corresponding in Aslaksen et al. (1990).
This reflect that the model of the oil market represented by (3) is very different from the
view represented by governmental projections. Most students of the oil market believed
that the OPEC I had shifted the market structure. The analysis in Green et al. (1993)
based on the same data shows that a series of shift can be identified. While OPEC I was
identified as a shift in their analysis, they used oil prices until 1989 to test this hypothesis.
But what could we know about the market structure with the data available in the 1970's?
To consider this we estimate a model with a OPEC I-dummy.
The modeling of OPEC I is not straightforward. The obvious first step is to introduce
a dummy d in (3) with value 1 from 1974 and zero before,
(9) Pt = cto qdt aiPt-i ut.
The estimated parameters for this model is presented in table 2, and the corresponding
wealth estimates in table 3.
We immediately notice that the wealth in 1974 is completely out of scale. At a closer
look we note that the long- term equilibrium price, which is approximately exp ( 1 ), is of
size 1000 dollar per barrel. We easily recognise why the model produces such results. In
Year Wt A Wte A Wtrw A Wr
1973 -32 100 -2
1974 70 -23 6 -12
1975 64 50 5 -12
1976 132 34 10 -7
1977 183 35 13 -3
1978 233 .	 -7 16 10
1979 232 364 15 24
1980 587 278 37 55
1981 848 75 55 59
1982 920 -14 61 51
1983 915 7 60 59
1984 923 254 60 62
1985 1176 -975 78 56
1986 223 70 14 16
1987 291 -98 19 21
1988 192 40 12 20
1989 223 - 14 30
Table 1: Petroleum wealth; AR(1) model without OPEC dummy.
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Year cto al q
1973 0.563 0.741 0.000
1974 0.563 0.741 1.231
1975 0.888 0.593 0.771
1976 0.939 0.570 0.678
1977 0.967 0.557 0.632
1978 0.990 0.547 0.597
1979 0.993 0.545 0.591
1980 0.961 0.560 0.625
1981 0.935 0.572 0.628
1982 0.923 0.577 0.629
1983 0.935 0.572 0.628
1984 0.950 0.565 0.625
1985 0.957 0.562 0.622
1986 0.997 0.543 0.585
1987 0.982 0.550 0.571
1988 0.941 0.569 0.520
1989 0.920 0.579 0.502
Table 2: Parameter estimates; AR(1) model with OPEC dummy.
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Year Wt A we A Wtr w A WtP
1973 -32 22640 -2 -4
1974 22609 -22948 1583 -12
1975 1257 -347 89 -12
1976 1011 -209 71 -7
1977 880 -44 62 -3
1978 900 -90 62 10
1979 863 83 59 24
1980 981 173 65 55
1981 1164 370 •	 77 59
1982 1553 346 105 51
1983 1952 220 133 59
1984 2246 -354 153 62
1985 1983 -530 135 56
1986 1532 -356 106 16
1987 1267 -16 87 21
1988 1316 -235 91 20
1989 1152 - 79 30
Table 3: Petroleum wealth; AR(1) model with OPEC dummy.
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1974, there is only one observation on which to base the estimate on the one parameter q.
Thus the model will fit this observation perfectly, i.e. u t = O and hence
Pt = ao q aiPt-i,
which implies that
Pt — Pt-i	 ( a° +	 Pt-i ) (1 — ai) .■1 — a l
Thus the shift from pt_ i to pt is interpreted as only a share (1 — a l ) of the underlying
long-term shift to the new long-term equilibrium. With the estimated a i , this shift is only
about 26 % of the total. Thus while the price increased with a factor of almost 3, this is
interpreted as the first 26 % of the total shift in a logarithmic scale. It seems fair to say
that this model does not reflect the prevailing view of the market in 1974.
A solution to this problem would be to adjust the model to
(10)	 Pt ao qdt-i aiPt-i Ut.
The lag in the dummy implies that the dummy first apply to the price changes from 1974
to 1975. The idea of this model is that the long run equilibrium shifted in 1974, but that
the change from 1973 to 1974 was extraordinary and hence (9) does not apply to 1974. We
believe that (10) corresponds better to the prevailing view. This model will be very sensitive
to the 1975 price, like the previous was sensitive to the 1974 price, but since there is not
as dramatic changes from 1974 to 1975, the estimates will be less extreme. On the other
hand, the value of q in 1974 is still a problem. Either the shift has not yet been recognized
and q = 0, or the shift has been recognized, but there is no observations on which to base
the estimate of q.
If the belief was that the new price was approximately the new long run equilibrium,
then Pt
 = (ao 01(1— ai), and hence
q pi974(1 — ai ) — ao .
While this assumption would be purely ad hoc, such leaps of faith would be necessary with
this model. Each new observation would considerably improve the knowledge about the
shift q, and as noted in the previous section, the effect on the oil wealth is approximately
like the effect of a high a l . If al is high too, the wealth will be very sensitive to new prices.
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Year a() al q
1973 0.563 0.741 0.000
1974 0.690 0.692 0.352
1975 0.690 0.692 0.205
1976 0.695 0.690 0.270
1977 0.695 0.690 0.285
1978 0.695 0.690 0.278
1979 0.698 0.688 0.303
1980 0.685 0.694 0.370
1981 0.652 0.709 0.375
1982 0.637 0.716 0.376
1983 0.646 0.712 0.375
1984 0.656 0.707 0.372
1985 0.658 0.706 0.370
1986 0.674 0.699 0.320
1987 0.693 0.691 0.335
1988 0.636 0.717 0.279
1989 0.638 0.716 0.281
Table 4: Parameter estimates; AR(1) model with lagged dummy.
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Year Wt LW A Wtr w LW!
1973 -32 571 -2 -4
1974 541 -362 39 -12
1975 229 174 17 -12
1976 432 34 31 -7
1977 503 34 35 -3
1978 576 -18 40 10
1979 588 229 39 24
1980 832 247 54 55
1981 1078 313 71 59
1982 1404 288 95 51
1983 1736 181 117 59
1984 1975 -229 134 62
1985 1818 -739 123 56
1986 1147 -180 79 16
1987 1029 -159 71 21
1988 920 -132 63 20
1989 831 - 56 30
Table 5: Petroleum wealth; AR(1) model with lagged dummy.
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The estimated parameters and the corresponding wealth is presented in tables 4 and 5,
respectively. The ad-hoc value of q in 1974 is about 0.35, compared to ao = 0.69. The first
estimated value is 0.20, increasing to 0.27 in 1978. The high prices after OPEC II shifts the
estimated value of q to 0.37 in 1980, and the value is quite stable after that. Thus the price
shift due to OPEC II has two effects on the wealth. Since al > 0, there is a direct effect on
expected future prices. With the rather low value of al
 = 0.7, 90 % of the direct effect has
vanished for prices 5 years ahead. Thus the direct effect on the wealth is rather modest. If
we only considered the time series properties of the price process, we would be mislead to
conclude that the petroleum wealth should be stable, but then we would miss the indirect
effect of the price shift, through parameter values, which is the most important. The shift
in the constant ao d- q is from 0.97 to 1.05. Simultaneously, a l increases, and the combined
effect is that the long-term equilibrium price increases from 23 dollar per barrel to 37 dollar
per barrel. This shift has a permanent effect on the expected prices, in the sense that all
the expected future prices, even far ahead, will be shifted.
Note that this shift is caused by OPEC II, while we have only introduced a dummy for
OPEC I. If an additional dummy for OPEC II is introduced, the model will be even more
sensitive to new information.
A possible problem with the analysis in this paper is the use of yearly prices. Monthly,
weekly or even daily prices are available, and with say monthly prices, we would have 36
observation after three years, and not just three as in the previous analysis. On the other
'land, a lag lenght of one year would require an AR(12) model with monthly data. Thus
there would be more parameters to estimate, which counters the effect of more observations.
The robustness of our conclusions to the use of yearly or monthly datas, is thus an empirical
question for future investigation.
5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that it is not sufficient to consider only the time series properties of
the oil price process to evaluate the stability of the petroleum wealth. Even if the process
has modest roots, shift in oil prices may have significant long-term effects through the new
information that these prices provides. The driving force of this result is the introduction of
a dummy for OPEC I. Observations of the price for the next ten years turned out to have
considerable impact on the best estimate of this shift.
18
Figure 1 summarizes the findings. The wealth path calculated in Aslaksen et al. (1990)
is included as a benchmark. Compared to those estimates, the wealth derived from the
AR(1) process with no dummy would be much lower. The relative changes in wealth are
still huge with the wealth increasing almost by a factor of four from 1979 to 1983 compated
to a factor of three in the lagged dummy model. On the other hand, the scale is lower. The
fluctuation of wealth due to changing prices is thus lower, at least in an absolute sence. The
explanation of this is simply that the period of low prices prior to 1973, dominates the data
set and hence the parameter estimates. Once we allow for a shift in the price in 1973, the
picture changes. First the post 1973 prices are now believed to be higher than the previous
one, and hence the level of the wealth increases. At the same time each new observation
contributes significantly to the available information and thus to the estimates. Thus the
wealth is more sensitive to price changes. We note that while the shift after OPEC II takes
longer time, the wealth eventually reaches the same level as the one reported in Aslaksen et
al. (1990). In this sense this study confirms the volatility of oil wealth.
The introduction of a dummy, is admittedly ad-hoc. A satisfactory study would require
a complete model with stable parameters. In particular we would like to have a model
that could account for the political shifts like the OPEC I-III episodes. This has been very
difficult to obtain for the oil market. However, even if we would be able to construct such
a model, the conclusions of this paper may still be true. Suppose that the price process is
a mixture of an AR(1) process and a Poisson-process, with sudden shifts at random years.
Even if we could find stable parameters of the distribution of the size and permanence of
these shift, the actual shifts would not be directly observable. In that case the observation
following a shift would provide essential new information, and thus be highly influencial on
the estimates of the petroleum wealth.
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